Report exposes data fabrication, missing ammo and server failures at FLA

A report by the Integrity Commission (IC) into the operations of the Firearm Licensing Authority (FLA) has uncovered the intentional manipulation of official digital records, inventory management failures, and the loss of critical electronic evidence following a server failure.

The 131-page report, tabled in Parliament on Tuesday eight weeks after it was first submitted at the end of March and only after a court ruling, details how official records were altered inside the FLA’s Licence Management System (LMS), the core platform used to track firearm ownership, ammunition purchases and dealer inventory flows.

According to the report, former database administrator Shevon Robinson manually inserted false transactions into a dealer’s system profile without any written request from the dealer or formal authorisation. The findings indicate the entries were not clerical errors but a deliberate attempt to create ghost transactions, making it appear that legitimate sales and purchases had occurred and that missing items were “accounted for” in the system.

The IC found that 6,000 rounds of ammunition were logged as sold to three individuals. However, one person had not purchased ammunition in years, another denied making the purchase, and a third was already dead at the time the transaction was recorded.

The investigation also highlighted significant inventory discrepancies. According to the findings, thousands of rounds of ammunition and possibly firearms were missing, and a public destruction notice dated April 26, 2021 may have been used to mask inventory gaps. Instead of admitting the missing items, they may have been recorded as destroyed.

While the investigation did not validate every allegation, it identified concrete failures. A targeted audit of 714 records from a total inventory of 4,103 found 335 rounds of ammunition missing. In one case, a bag that should have contained 519 rounds held only 219, leaving 191 rounds unaccounted for.

The report further identified systemic weaknesses, including deteriorating storage bags with holes and fading labels, overcrowded vault conditions, and poor inventory-tracking practices.

A major obstacle to the investigation was the collapse of the evidentiary trail. The IC reported that the FLA’s main server suffered a “catastrophic failure” in 2019 and there was no backup system in place. As a result, critical logs that could have identified who altered records were lost, limiting the commission’s ability to establish criminal accountability despite evidence that manipulation had occurred.

Director of Investigations at the Integrity Commission, Kevon Stephenson, said the missing data significantly hampered the probe.

"The DI recommends that, given the critical nature of the operation of the FLA, if not yet done, the FLA must ensure that their servers are properly maintained and that a backup server exists. This may ensure that, in the event of a failure of the main server, all data is not lost,” Stephenson stated.

"The DI's recommendation is grounded in the fact that the FLA's server apparently suffered a catastrophic failure, the data stored thereon could not be recovered, and there was no backup storage in place,” he added.

While the investigation does not conclusively prove a coordinated cover-up, it established that official firearm transaction records were manipulated, physical ammunition discrepancies existed, inventory controls were weak, and critical digital evidence was lost.

Among its recommendations, the IC said the “FLA must enforce a strict, documented protocol for data entries. No internal FLA employee should modify the dealer-facing transaction databases without an explicit, archived written request from an authorized firearm dealer alongside official management approval”.

It also said the “FLA must immediately expand main vault capacity, upgrade inventory-management tracking, and replace deteriorating security storage bags to prevent information labels from fading or tearing”.

Finally, on server resilience and data protection, the report stated: “Given the high-security operations of the FLA, management must deploy robust server maintenance schedules and establish functional offsite backup infrastructure to prevent data loss from catastrophic hardware failures.”